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In modal logic, when adding a syntactic property to an axiomatisation, this property will
semantically become true in all models, in all situations, under all circumstances. For
instance, adding a property like Kap → Kb p (agent b knows at least what agent a knows)
to an axiomatisation of some epistemic logic has as an effect that such a property becomes
globally true, i.e., it will hold in all states, at all time points (in a temporal setting), after
every action (in a dynamic setting) and after any communication (in an update setting),
and every agent will know that it holds, it will even be common knowledge. We propose a
way to express that a property like the above only needs to hold locally: it may hold in the
actual state, but not in all states, and not all agents may know that it holds. We achieve this
by adding relational atoms to the language that represent (implicitly) quantiﬁcation over all
formulas, as in ∀p(Kap → Kb p). We show how this can be done for a rich class of modal
logics and a variety of syntactic properties. We then study the epistemic logic enriched
with the syntactic property ‘knowing at least as much as’ in more detail. We show that the
enriched language is not preserved under bisimulations. We also demonstrate that adding
public announcements to this enriched epistemic logic makes it more expressive, which is
for instance not true for the ‘standard’ epistemic logic S5.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Modal logic has become the framework for formalising areas in computer science and artiﬁcial intelligence as diverse as
distributed computing [14], reasoning about programs [15], verifying temporal properties of systems [17], game theoretic
reasoning [25], and specifying and verifying multi-agent systems [31]. Regarding the latter example alone, since Moore’s
pioneering work [19] on knowledge and action, agent theories like intention logic [5] and BDI [20] use modal logic (where
the modalities represent time, action, informational attitudes like knowledge or belief, or motivational attitudes like desires
or intentions) to analyse interactions between modalities, like perfect recall, no-learning, realism, or different notions of com-
mitment. As for epistemic modal logic, since the seminal work of Hintikka [16], modal epistemic logic has played a key
role in knowledge representation, witnessed by the literature on reasoning about knowledge in computer science [7], and
artiﬁcial intelligence [18]. The current activities in dynamic epistemic logic [1,27] can be seen as providing a modal logical
analysis in the area of belief revision, thereby providing it with a natural basis for multi-agent belief revision, giving an
account of the change of higher order information, and capturing this all in one and the same object language: a modal
language, indeed.
The popularity of modal logic in those areas is partly explained by its appealing semantics: the notion of state is
a very powerful one when it comes to modeling computations of a machine, or describing possibilities that an agent
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134 H. van Ditmarsch et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 187–188 (2012) 133–155thinks/desires/fears to be possible. Another strong feature of modal logic is its ﬂexibility: the fact that temporal, dynamic,
informational and motivational attitudes can be represented by modalities does not mean that they all satisfy the same laws.
Rather, depending on the interpretation one has in mind, one can decide to either embrace or abandon certain principles
for each of the modalities used. Syntactically, this means one assumes a number of axioms or inference rules for a modality
or for the interaction of some modalities, and more often than not, this semantically corresponds to assuming some speciﬁc
properties of the associated accessibility relations in the corresponding models.
In the context of epistemic logic for instance, adding speciﬁc modal axioms allows one to specify that the knowing
agent is veridical (Kap → p): if agent a knows that p, then p must be true, or that he is positively (Kap → KaKap) or
negatively (¬Kap → Ka¬Kap) introspective. Those axioms happen to correspond (in a precise way: correspondence theory
for modal logic is already some decades old, cf. [23]) to reﬂexivity, transitivity and Euclidicity of the associated accessibility
relation Ra , respectively. Moreover, the axioms are canonical for it: adding the syntactic axiom to a modal logic enforces the
canonical model for the logic to have the corresponding property, which then in turn implies that completeness of the logic
with respect to the class of models satisfying that relational property is guaranteed. At this point, it is important to note the
difference between Kap → p as a formula and that as a scheme, or axiom: as a formula, it merely expresses that regarding
the atom p, agent a does not know it without it being true. However, when we assume it as an axiom, or as a scheme, it
means that we declare it to hold for every substitution instance of p, in other words, we assume that for all formulas ϕ ,
the implication Kaϕ → ϕ holds.
It is often argued (indeed, already by Hintikka in [16]) that a distinguishing feature between knowledge and belief is
that whereas knowledge is veridical, belief need not be, i.e., the scheme Bap → p should not be assumed as an axiom for
belief. This then simply entails that epistemic logics have veridicality as an axiom, and doxastic logics have not. Semantically
speaking: the accessibility relations denoting knowledge are reﬂexive, those denoting belief need not be. But how then to
deal with a situation where we want to express that “currently, a’s beliefs happen to be true”? If we add Bap → p as
an axiom to our logic, the effect is that in all models (with respect to which the logic is complete), and in all states, all
instances of that axiom are true, i.e., for all models M , for all states s and for all formulas ϕ , we then have M, s | Baϕ → ϕ .
Given a model M and a state s we can express that a’s belief that an individual proposition q holds is correct: M, s | Baq∧q.
And we can express that a’s belief about q is correct: M, s | (Baq → q) ∧ (Ba¬q → ¬q). But what we cannot express in
modal logic is that Baϕ → ϕ holds for all ϕ in one state, without claiming at the same time it should hold throughout the
model. As a consequence, we cannot express in the object language that agent b thinks that agent a’s beliefs are correct,
while agent c believes that a is wrong about a proposition q. The closest one gets to expressing that would be to say that
for all ϕ , in M, s we have M, s | Bb(Baϕ → ϕ) ∧ Bc((Baq ∧ ¬q) ∨ (Ba¬q ∧ q)) (but here, the quantiﬁcation over ϕ is on a
meta-level, and not in the scope of Bb). Neither can we say, in a temporal doxastic context, that a’s beliefs now are correct,
but tomorrow they need not be.
To give another example of the same phenomenon, suppose one adds the scheme Kap → Kbp to a modal logic (b knows
everything that a knows). Semantically, this means Rb ⊆ Ra . If the logic is about a set of agents A, then it becomes common
knowledge among A that b knows at least what a knows! And if there is a notion of time, we have that it will always be
the case that b knows at least what a knows, and, when having modalities for actions, it follows that no action can make
it come about that a has a secret for b, in particular, it is impossible to inform a about something that b does not already
know—this rules out dynamics which are, in contrast, very possible in dynamic epistemic logic.
So, the general picture in modal logic that we take as our starting point is the following. One has a modal logic to which
one adds an axiom scheme θ (say, Bap → p). If one is lucky, the scheme corresponds to a relational property Θ(x) (in the
case above, Rxx). However, adding θ to the logic means having Θ(x) true everywhere, implying that θ is always true. What
we are after is looking at ways to enforce the scheme θ locally. To do so, we will add a marker  to the modal language,
such that  is true locally, in a state s, if and only if Θ is true, locally (i.e., Rss holds).
In [28], in the context of a multi-agent logic S5, this is done for the scheme ‘knowing at least as much as’. The expression
a b in [28], when true at w means formally ‘a considers at least as many accessible worlds from w as b’, and informally
‘a is at least as uncertain as b about the actual state of affairs at w ’, is an example of such a marker (a,b), named
Sup(a,b) here, and in this case Θ(a,b)(x) is the property ∀y(Rbxy ⇒ Raxy). The results of [28] are generalised in [29] to
more general modal logics K(+ϕ1, . . . ,+ϕn) for formulas ϕi satisfying some additional condition, and this is also the main
focus of our current contribution.
It is also possible to add several markers at the same time. This then enables that not only can we make global properties
locally true, but it also allows for more subtle quantiﬁcations over formulas than is allowed in modal logic. This makes it
possible to express properties like “If all of John’s beliefs are correct, than so must Mary’s beliefs be”, or “If John knows now
everything that Mary knows, then that must have been true yesterday as well” or “If John’s beliefs are correct, then he must
know that Mary’s beliefs are correct as well”. The quantiﬁcation needed for the latter — ∀ϕ(B jϕ → ϕ)→ K j∀ψ(Bmψ →ψ)
— cannot even be achieved by adding an axiom! For more examples of such quantiﬁcation, see Section 2.1.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 1.1 we outline our approach towards a modal logic with local schemes and
we explain how, for a variety of property schemes θ , one can enforce them to be locally true. To understand our approach,
one needs to carefully distinguish between three formal languages, which we formally deﬁne in Section 2. Then, in Section 3,
we provide a general way to enrich a modal logic with relational atoms, in such a way that the resulting logic is sound and
complete with respect to models where those atoms deﬁne, in a local sense, to a ﬁrst order property. In Section 4 we then
zoom in on the speciﬁc relational atom a  b, which locally speciﬁes that Ra ⊇ Rb . In particular, we give the modalities in
H. van Ditmarsch et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 187–188 (2012) 133–155 135this section an epistemic interpretation, so that a b captures Kap → Kbp as a local property, i.e., we study such a scheme
locally within a modal epistemic logic. Finally, in Section 5 we summarise and conclude.
1.1. Towards a modal logic with local schemes
In this paper, we describe two languages to reason about Kripke models. The place where these languages meet is
important for our set-up. Let us outline the overall approach with the aim of an example: formal deﬁnitions follow in
Section 2. First of all, we are interested in a modal scheme θ(a,b, p), which in our example reads [a]p → [b]p in a modal
language L (generally, we write [a]ϕ for modal formulas, but for epistemic interpretations we may write Kaϕ , and for
doxastic ones Baϕ). To the modal language we add a relational atom (a,b), or, in this speciﬁc case Sup(a,b), which will
be true in a state s iff ∀y(Rbsy ⇒ Rasy) holds. The latter property is a formula Θ(a,b)(s) in a ﬁrst-order language L1.
Our modal logic should now formalise the idea that θ(a,b, p) and (a,b) ‘capture the same’. Indeed, we will add
(a,b) → θ(a,b, p) (in our example: Sup(a,b) → ([a]p → [b]p)) as an axiom to the logic. However, we will argue that
one cannot just add the opposite direction as an axiom. Instead, the logic will take on an inference rule that ensures that
something along the following lines holds: consistency of a formula ϕ with an occurrence of ¬  (a,b) is the same as
consistency of ϕ with the occurrence of ¬ (a,b) replaced by ¬θ(a,b, p) (where p is a fresh atom). For completeness of
the logic, we then take care that in its canonical model, the truth of θ(a,b, p) in a speciﬁc world (i.e., maximal consistent
set ) coincides with property Θ().
The languages that we deﬁne are simple extensions of languages usually studied in standard modal logic [3,4]. More
speciﬁcally, our modal logic extends that of modal logic with some relational atoms , and the ﬁrst order language is the
standard language to reason about properties of accessibility relations. Our completeness proof, in turn, is an extension
of ‘standard’ completeness proofs in modal logic: we sometimes have to add fresh atoms p to ensure that θ(a,b, p) is
satisﬁed. We have borrowed ideas from [6] to prove our Extension Lemma 2 and ideas from [9–11,21] to make this lemma
work ‘everywhere in the canonical model’. Finally, from [11,12] we borrow the notion of r-persistence (imposed on θ(a, p)
here) to make our completeness proof work.
2. Language and semantics
As outlined above, we deal with two languages, which are all interpreted over the same objects, i.e., Kripke models.
The languages are an extended modal language L, and a ﬁrst order language L1. For both languages, we assume a (ﬁnite,
although this is not crucial for our results) set of modality labels A = {a1, . . . ,a|A|}. In the modal language, these will give
rise to modalities [a], and in the other language, we assume to have a binary relation Ra for each a ∈ A. For the latter
language, we also assume to have a set of variables X = {x, y, . . .}. The variables will range over possible worlds: note that
in L1 we do not assume to have constants. For the modal language L we assume a ﬁnite set ρ = {1,2, . . . ,m} of
relational atoms: they are nothing else than atomic symbols of which the truth depends on local properties of accessibility
relations (see the function I in Deﬁnition 3). Therefore, we will often write (a1, . . . ,an) rather than  to make this
dependence clear, and treat  as if it were an n-ary relational predicate (rather than an atomic symbol). Our languages will
be denoted L(A,π,ρ) (the modal language), and L1(A,X ) (the ﬁrst order language). If the parameters for the languages
are clear, we will also write L, and L1, respectively.
Deﬁnition 1 (Modal language). Let the sets A,π , and ρ be as described above. The modal language L(A,π,ρ) is deﬁned as
follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [a]ϕ |(a1, . . . ,an)
where a,a1, . . . ,an ∈ A, p ∈ π and  is an n-ary relational atom in ρ . Formula 〈a〉ϕ is shorthand for ¬[a]¬ϕ and we also
assume the usual deﬁnitions for disjunction, implication and bi-implication. If the modality is an epistemic one, the labels
denote agents, and we write Kaϕ rather than [a]ϕ . For a doxastic interpretation we write Baϕ , etc.
A formula without occurrences of relational atoms is called a purely modal formula. Suppose we have a multi-modal
formula θ(a1, . . . ,an, p1, . . . , pk) where a1, . . . ,an are labels of modalities [a1], . . . , [an] and p1, . . . , pk are atoms. We will
write a for the tuple a1, . . . ,an and p for p1, . . . , pk . When we write a ∈ a we mean that a is one of the labels occurring
in the tuple a, likewise for p and p. Finally, for any tuple x = x1, . . . , xn with each xi taken from some set X , we will write
x ∈ X .
Deﬁnition 2 (First order language). Let A and X be given. First deﬁne a language L+(A,X ):
Θ := Raxy | ∀yΘ | ¬Θ |Θ &Θ
with a ∈ A, and x, y ∈ X . Now, our ﬁrst order language L1(A,X ) is the one-free-variable sublanguage of L+ , i.e., the
sublanguage of L+ consisting of all formulas with one variable not in the scope of a quantiﬁer. If Θ ∈L1(A,X ) has x as its
only free variable, and if a1, . . .an are all the modality labels occurring in Θ , we will also write Θ(a)(x) for Θ .
As mentioned earlier, both languages will be interpreted over Kripke models.
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In this table, a is a sequence a or (a,b) or (a,b, c) of modality labels, and p is either the single atom p or the sequence p,q. Θ(a)(x)
is a property of a state x, and (a) is a name in the object language such that (a) holds at w iff Θ(a)(w) holds of M .
θ(a, p) Θ(a)(x) (a)
[a]p → [b]p ∀y(Rbxy ⇒ Raxy) Sup(a,b)
[c]p → [a][b]p ∀y, z((Raxy & Rb yz)⇒ Rcxz) Trans(a,b, c)
¬[a]⊥ ∃yRaxy Ser(a)
[a]p → p Raxx Reﬂ(a)
〈a〉p → [b]〈c〉p ∀yz((Raxy & Rbxz)⇒ Rc yz) Eucl(a,b, c)
〈a〉p → 〈b〉〈c〉p ∀z(Raxz ⇒ ∃yRbxy & Rc zy) Dens(a,b, c)
(〈a〉p ∧ 〈b〉q)→ 〈c〉(p ∧ q) ∀y, z((Raxy & Rbxz)⇒ (y = z & Rcxy)) Func(a,b, c)
Deﬁnition 3 (Kripke models and frames). Given A, π and ρ , a Kripke model for A,π and ρ (or, a Kripke model, if A, π and
ρ are clear, or not relevant) is a tuple M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 where
• W is a set of possible worlds, also called states
• R : A → ℘(W × W ) assigns a binary relation to each modality label
• I : ρ →L1(A,X ) assigns a ﬁrst order property to each relational atom in ρ
• V : π → ℘(W ) assigns a set of possible worlds to each propositional variable
Rather then (w, v) ∈ R(a) we will write Rawv . For M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 and w ∈ W , we let Ra(w) denote {v ∈ W | Rawv}.
A Kripke frame is a tuple F = 〈W , R, I〉 such that 〈M, V 〉 = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 is a model. The ‘arity’ of a symbol  ∈ ρ can be
read off from its interpretation I(): if I() refers to modalities a1, . . . ,an , then we may write (a) for . A pointed Kripke
model is a pair (M,w) where w ∈ W is a designated point (‘the actual world’); we often delete the parentheses around it.
We will sometimes use the terminology of I-models and I-frames to highlight the additional interpretation I compared to
‘standard’ [3] Kripke models.
Deﬁnition 4 (Semantics of modal formulas). Let A and π be given. Also, let M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉. Then we deﬁne, for ϕ ∈
L(A,π,ρ):
M,w | p iff w ∈ V (p)
M,w | ¬ϕ iff M,w | ϕ
M,w | ϕ ∧ψ iff M,w | ϕ and M,w |ψ
M,w | [a]ϕ iff for all v if Rawv , then M, v | ϕ
M,w |(a) iff I((a))(w) holds
The class of all models over A,π and ρ is denoted K(A,π,ρ). All models with interpretation I are denoted K(A,π,ρ, I).
Validity of ϕ in a model M (denoted by M | ϕ) is deﬁned as usual. Moreover, K(A,π,ρ) | ϕ means that for all models
M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 over A,π and ρ , we have M | ϕ . If F = 〈W , R, I〉 is a frame, F ,w | ϕ is deﬁned as: for all valuations
V , 〈W , R, I, V 〉,w | ϕ . To distinguish our models and frames from how they are usually deﬁned in modal logic, we will
sometimes refer to them as I-models and I-frames, respectively.
Interpretation of L1(A,X )-formulas in a model M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 is straightforward. For L2(A,Π,X ), we assume that
P (s) holds for a predicate P iff s ∈ V (p). In other words, the link between a propositional atom and a unary predicate is
implicit by using lower-case and upper-case notation.
Example 1. We give three examples: more are provided in Table 1.
1. Let (a,b) be such that in M with interpretation I , we have I((a,b))=Θ(a,b) where Θ(a,b)(x) = ∀y(Rbxy ⇒ Raxy),
saying that in the current world w , the set of a-successors of w is a superset of the set of b-successors of w . If this is
the interpretation of (a,b), we will also write Sup(a,b).
2. As a second example, take =(a) to be such that I((a))(x) = Raxx. Note that Ba  (a) can hence be interpreted as
‘a believes that his beliefs are correct’, since M,w | Ba  (a) does entail that for all ϕ , M,w | Ba(Baϕ → ϕ) (but see
Remark 1).
3. Finally, take (a,b, c) with I((a,b, c))(x)= ∀y∀z((Raxy &Rb yz)⇒ Rcxz). We will write Trans(a,b, c) for Θ(a,b, c). Of
course, a special case of this is =(a,a,a) saying that currently, at world w , the relation Ra is transitive.
Remark 1. Take (a) and M such that I((a)) = ∀xRaxx. Note that although M,w |(a) entails that agent a’s beliefs are
correct, the converse is not true, as the following example shows (see Fig. 1). Let M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 be such that W = {w,u},
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Fig. 2. A model M,w . The atom p is true exactly in the worlds that are ﬁlled black.
and Ra = {(w,u), (u,w)}. Moreover, assume that for all p, w ∈ V (p) iff u ∈ V (p). Since (M,w) and (M,u) are bisimilar
models ([4, Chapters 1 and 5]), we have M,w | ϕ iff M,u | ϕ , and hence M,w | Baϕ → ϕ , for all purely modal ϕ .
However, since (w,w) /∈ Ra , we have M,w | ¬ (a).
Note that, since Θ(a)(w) does not refer to atomic propositions p (or, rather predicates P ), we have that Θ(a)(w) holds
in the model M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 iff Θ(a)(w) holds in the frame F = 〈W , R, I〉.
Deﬁnition 5.
1. Let ϕ ∈L(A,π,ρ), and Φ some property which applies to states in a frame.
(a) We say that ϕ deﬁnes the frame property Φ if for every frame F = 〈W , R, I〉 we have F | ϕ iff Φ holds of F .
(b) ϕ is said to locally deﬁne Φ(x) if for every frame F and every w ∈ W , we have F ,w | ϕ iff Φ(w) holds in F .
2. Let θ(a, p) be a purely modal formula, (a) ∈ ρ and Θ(a)(x) a ﬁrst order property. If θ(a, p) locally deﬁnes Θ(a)(x)
and I is such that I((a))=Θ(a)(x), then we say that I semantically links θ(a, p) and (a) through Θ(a)(x).
Item 1 of Deﬁnition 5 generalises a deﬁnition of [12, pp. 180, 181] to I-frames. Our completeness proof relies on even a
stronger notion, although there we restrict ourselves to the case of ﬁrst order properties (i.e., item 2 of Deﬁnition 5). The
notions deﬁned in the ﬁrst item are also known as correspondence (between a modal formula and some, usually, ﬁrst order
property). There is in fact a rich literature on modal correspondence theory: see for instance the early [23], the chapter on
local correspondence in the later [24] and the more recent [4, Chapter 1] and [3, Chapter 3] and the references therein.
Take the speciﬁc example in a doxastic context where Θ(a)(x) is Raxx, and I((a)) = Θ(a). Note that θ(a, p) = (Bap →
p) deﬁnes Θ(a)(x) but still, as shown in Remark 1, the formulas (a) and θ(a, p) are not equivalent. Still, the two should
be strongly connected, in a sense we will explain in Section 3. We ﬁrst look at an example, involving our extended modal
language.
2.1. A simple example
Consider ﬁve friends, Joey, Chandler, Ross, Monica and Phoebe (or j, c, r,m and p, for short). In this example, we use
‘think’ and ‘believe’ for the same thing. Joey believes that Monica’s beliefs are at least as accurate as Ross’ beliefs, i.e.,
Joey believes that if Ross’ beliefs are correct, so must Monica’s be (A). Joey also believes that Monica thinks that Chandler
believes anything that Monica believes (B). Although Joey does not think that he believes everything he knows (he thinks
that he knows he cannot ﬁnd a job as an actor, but at the same time cannot believe it), he actually believes anything
he knows (C ). Moreover, Joey thinks that Chandler’s beliefs are consistent (D). Finally, Joey happens to know that Monica
believes that Phoebe is in competition with her for Chandler’s attention, but at the same time Joey thinks that Chandler
believes that Phoebe is not in competition with Monica for his attention (E). Then, we conclude that Joey believes that Ross’
beliefs are not guaranteed to be correct (F ), or, better, that Joey believes he may assume that some formula is believed by
Ross, but not true (F ′).
We ﬁrst give a (semi-formal) formalisation of our assumption using a modal logic that allows for quantiﬁcation over
formulas. Let z represent the proposition that Joey cannot ﬁnd himself a job as an actor, and let q be the proposition that
Phoebe is in competition with Monica for Chandler’s attention. This formalisation is given in Table 2, where assumption (A)
in our informal description is represented as (a), etc. The formalisation in our language L(A,π,ρ) follows in Table 3.
We can now be more precise about what it means that our language can do more than just formalising a local version
of a global property. For instance, the global property Bap → p will have a local counterpart Reﬂ(a). Locally, this will denote
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A semi-formal translation of the episode.
(a) B j(∀ϕ(Brϕ → ϕ)→ ∀ϕ(Bmϕ → ϕ))
(b) B j Bm(∀ϕ(Bmϕ → Bcϕ))
(c) ¬B j(K j z → B j z)∧ ∀ϕ(K jϕ → B jϕ)
(d) B j∀ϕ(¬(Bcϕ ∧ Bc¬ϕ))
(e) K j Bmq ∧ B j Bc¬q
( f ) B j¬∀ϕ(Brϕ → ϕ)
Table 3
A formalisation of the episode.
(a′) B j(Reﬂ(r)→ Reﬂ(m))
(b′) B j BmSup(m, c)
(c′) ¬B j(K j z → B j z)∧ Sup(kj,k)
(d′) B jSer(c)
(e′) K j Bmq ∧ B j Bc¬q
( f ′) B j¬Reﬂ(r)
something that is similar to ∀ϕ(Baϕ → ϕ). But if one looks at our formalisation (a) as given in Table 2, which is our
formalisation of the assumption (A) that was given at the beginning of this example, i.e., B j(∀ϕ(Brϕ → ϕ) → ∀ϕ(Bmϕ →
ϕ)), it becomes clear that this is different from the quantiﬁcation (g) : ∀ϕB j((Brϕ → ϕ) → (Bmϕ → ϕ)), which one would
get as a local counterpart of an axiom B j((Br p → p) → (Bmp → p)). That (a) and (g) are not equivalent, can be seen in
the model M,w of Fig. 2, where (a) is true in M,w , but (g) is not: for the latter, ϕ = p provides a counter-example. That
(a) is true in M,w is easily seen from realising that a is formalised by a′ in Table 3.
We then formalise the same episode using the relational atoms (a) introduced in Table 1, which results in Table 3.
Abusing the language somewhat, we write Sup(kj, j) for the relational atom corresponding to K jϕ → B jϕ—from a language
point of view, K j and B j are simply two different modal operators, say [kj] and [i], respectively.
3. Axiomatization
The aim of this section is to provide an axiomatisation for modal logics that are enriched with some relational atoms
1(a1), . . . ,m(am), such that for every k(k  m), there is a modal formula θk (a, p) such that, at least on frames,
the two ‘mean the same thing’. In fact, the logic K(A,π,ρ, I) that we deﬁne should be sound and complete with re-
spect to K(A,π,ρ, I), so our aim for our logic is that for all formulas ϕ ∈ L(A,π,ρ), the notions K(A,π,ρ, I)  ϕ and
K(A,π,ρ, I) | ϕ coincide. The idea to achieve this is as follows. In order to characterise the ‘meaning’ of (a), we ﬁrst like
to specify what follows from it (‘elimination of (a)’): this will be speciﬁed by axiom Ax in Table 4. Secondly, we need to
characterise when one can derive that (a) (‘introduction of (a)’), which is our inference rule R in that table. To make
this all work, we moreover rely on a ﬁrst order property Θ(a) that can be used as the interpretation of (a), and which is
locally deﬁned by θ(a, p). It will turn out that ﬁnding such a property is not easy or indeed possible for all θ(a, p), so we
will need to impose an additional condition on it: this will be done in Deﬁnition 11. This condition may look rather ad-hoc,
but, as we will mention in Section 3.3, it is implied by a well-known property of local r-persistence. We will provide a formal
soundness and completeness result for our logic, and will discuss connections with related approaches and techniques in
Section 3.3.
Before plunging in the technical details, in order to get a feel for our axiomatisation, it pays off to recall that a formula of
the form (a) is a label (like Sup(a,b)), which represents both a modal formula θ(a, p) (like [a]p → [b]p) and a ﬁrst-order
property Θ(a)(x) (like ∀y(Rbxy ⇒ Raxy)).
This is a good point to remind ourselves of the axiomatisation of the ∀ quantiﬁer in ﬁrst order logic. Formulated in our
context (and quantifying over atomic variables), it has an axiom and an inference rule (let us for simplicity assume that p
coincides with p, i.e., we only have one atom in θ(a, p)):
Ax∀ ∀pθ(a, p)→ θ(a, p)
R∀ from ϕ → θ(a, p) infer ϕ → ∀pθ(a, p)
where P does not occur in Γˆ
Our axiomatisation is then obtained by (i) choosing (a) for θ(a, p) and (ii), adding a ‘modal component’ to the
inference rule, which ensures that θ(a, p) may be replaced by (a) ‘anywhere in the model’.
We now explain our axiom and inference rule in pure modal logic terms, as follows. First of all, suppose that for every
relational atom (a) and ﬁxed interpretation I we have a formula θ(a, p) such that θ(a, p) deﬁnes I((a)). Then, for each
(a) and related θ(a, p) we add an axiom Ax , which is (a) → θ(a, p) to our logic K(A,π,ρ, I). This makes sense,
given Ax∀ and our observation above that (a) is equivalent to ∀PΘˆ(a, P )(x), and the instance Θˆ(a,P)(x) corresponds to
the modal formula θ(a, p).
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The axioms and inference rules of the logic K(A,π,ρ, I).
Prop All instances of propositional tautologies
K [a](ϕ →ψ)→ ([a]ϕ → [a]ψ)
Ax (a)→ θ(a, p)
MP From ϕ →ψ and ϕ, infer ψ
Nec From ϕ, infer [a]ϕ
R From [s]θ(a, p) infer [s] (a) where p does
not occur in s
US From ϕ infer ϕ[ψ/p]
Adding the other direction as an implication does not work, as the example (a) = (a,b) = Sup(a,b) and θ(a, p) =
[a]p → [b]p shows: ([a]p → [b]p) → Sup(a,b) is not a validity: the antecedent may be true due to some speciﬁc choice
of p. Note that the modal reading of the rule R∀ in our language would give
R from ϕ → θ(a, p) infer ϕ →(a)
where p does not occur in ϕ
The rule R will indeed be derivable in our logic, but we need a little bit more. We will argue how to obtain R and its
generalisation, R , by going back to the semantics of our modal language. Suppose that K(A,π,ρ, I) | ϕ → ([a]p → [b]p),
where p does not occur in ϕ . This then means that ϕ must entail that (locally) all b-successors are a-successors, i.e.,
K(A,π,ρ, I) | ϕ → Sup(a,b), because if the latter would not hold, there would be a model M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 such that
M,w, | ϕ ∧ ¬Sup(a,b). But since p does not occur in ϕ , we could then change the valuation V for p freely without
changing that of ϕ , in particular we can choose V ′ such that x ∈ V ′(p) iff Rawx (and V ′(q) = V (q) for atoms q = p). It is
easy to see that in the resulting model M ′ = 〈W , R, I, V ′〉 we have M ′,w | ϕ∧¬([a]p → [b]p): a contradiction. This means
that we need to be able to infer the following in K(A,π, {Sup(a,b)}, I):
If K(A,π,{Sup(a,b)}, I) | ϕ → ([a]p → [b]p)
then K(A,π,{Sup(a,b)}, I) | ϕ → Sup(a,b),
where p /∈ ϕ (1)
The rule (1) is of course a special case of R∀ . It can also be understood as follows. If p does not occur in ϕ , and ϕ →
([a]p → [b]p) is true at a state s, then ϕ must carry suﬃcient information such that [a]p → [b]p must hold (it will not be
because of speciﬁc requirements on p imposed by ϕ) and hence we must have ϕ → Sup(a,b) holding at s as well. But in
fact we can do the same reasoning that involves successors of s: suppose ϕ implies that in all Rc-successors t of s, we have
M, t | [a]p → [b]p. Then (in the same way as for s), we must have M, t | ϕ → Sup(a,b). In other words, the following
should hold for K(A,π, {Sup(a,b)}, I):
If K(A,π,{Sup(a,b)}, I) | ϕ → [c]([a]p → [b]p)
then K(A,π,{Sup(a,b)}, I) | ϕ → [c]Sup(a,b),
where p /∈ ϕ (2)
And the same should hold for all Rd-successors u of all Rc-successors t of s, etc. To formalise that a property θ(a, p) holds
after arbitrary sequences ϕ1 → [a1](ϕ2 → . . . [an−1](ϕn → θ(a, p)) . . .), we follow [28] and introduce pseudo-modalities: we
will then present an inference rule R for every  ∈ ρ to our axiomatisation K(A,π,ρ, I).
Deﬁnition 6 (Pseudo-modalities). We deﬁne the following pseudo-modalities, which are (possibly empty) sequences s = ()
or s = (s1, . . . , sn), where each si is a formula or a modality label. The formula 〈s〉ϕ represents an L(A,Π,ρ) formula, as





〈ψ, s2, . . . , sn〉ϕ =ψ ∧ 〈s2, . . . , sn〉ϕ
〈a, s2, . . . , sn〉ϕ = 〈a〉
(〈s2, . . . , sn〉ϕ)
We also deﬁne [s]ϕ as ¬〈s〉¬ϕ . We say that p does not occur in s (and write p /∈ s) if none of the atoms p occurring in
p does occur in any of the formulas si in s.
So, for instance 〈a,ψ,b〉ϕ is an abbreviation of 〈a〉(ψ ∧ 〈b〉ϕ), while [a,ψ,b]ϕ is short for [a](ψ → [b]ϕ).
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In this table MP stands for Modus Ponens, Nec for Necessitation, and US for Uniform Substitution (ϕ[ψ/p] stands for
substitution of ψ for every occurrence of p in ϕ). If (a) and θ(a, p) are connected through the axiom Ax and inference
rule R , we say they are axiomatically linked (through axiom Ax and rule R). If there is a derivation of a formula ϕ from
a set of formulas Γ using Γ and the axioms and inference rules from K(A,π,ρ, I) we write Γ K(A,π,ρ,I) ϕ , or Γ K ϕ , for
short.
Example 2. Suppose  is Sup(a,b), so that θ(a, p)= [a]p → [b]p. Then Axiom Ax becomes (a,b)→ ([a]p → [b]p). And
the inference rule R becomes: from 〈s〉([a]p ∧ ¬[b]p)→ ϕ , infer 〈s〉¬Sup(a,b)→ ϕ , where p does not occur in ϕ or s.
Lemma 1. Let p be a sequence of atoms not occurring in ϕ . Then rule R is an instance of R obtained with s = (), and R is equivalent
to R1 and R2:
R From ¬θ(a, p)→ ϕ, infer ¬ (a)→ ϕ
R1 If 〈s〉¬ (a)∧ ϕ is consistent,
then so is 〈s〉¬θ(a, p)∧ ϕ
R2 From 〈s〉¬θ(a, p)→ ϕ, infer 〈s〉¬ (a)→ ϕ
Theorem 1 (Soundness). For all ϕ ∈L(A,π,ρ), if K(A,π,ρ, I)  ϕ thenK(A,π,ρ, I) | ϕ .
Proof. We only show that axiom Ax and rule R1 are valid, the latter demonstrating validity of R: all the other axioms
and rules are standard. Starting with Ax , take a model M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉, where I is a parameter of the logic, and W , R
and V are arbitrary. If M,w |(a), this means that I((a))(w) holds. Since θ(a, p) characterises I((a)), we get M,w |
θ(a, p).
Next, we will argue that, if p does not occur in s and ϕ , then
If 〈s〉¬ (a)∧ ϕ is satisﬁable, then so is 〈s〉¬θ(a, p)∧ ϕ
First of all, note that we can assume that s never needs two successive agents a and b (we can separate them with ) and
neither does s need two successive formulas (we can replace them by their conjunction). Moreover we can assume that s
is either empty or else starts with a modality (a possible condition can be added to ϕ). If s = (), then the assumption says
that ¬ (a)∧ ϕ is satisﬁable. That is, there is a model M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 and a state w ∈ W such that M,w | ¬ (a)∧ ϕ .
The ﬁrst part of this conjunction says that ¬I((a))(w). Since θ(a, p) locally deﬁnes I((a)), and, since p does not occur
in ϕ , we can change the valuation V for p without changing the truth of ϕ . In other words, we can deﬁne a new model
M ′ = 〈W , R, I, V ′〉 where the truth of p ∈ p in M ′ is such that it falsiﬁes θ(a, p), but if keeps the truth of ϕ unchanged.
We have M ′,w | ¬θ(a, p)∧ ϕ , demonstrating the satisﬁability of 〈s〉¬θ(a, p)∧ ϕ .
Now we use induction and assume that s = 〈c,ψ〉 · t , where ψ is a formula (not containing p), c an arbitrary modality,
t a sequence (not containing p) and · denotes concatenation of sequences. Suppose 〈〈c,ψ〉 · t〉¬ (a)∧ ϕ is satisﬁable. This
means that at some M,w , we have M,w | ϕ and for some v with Rcwv , M, v | 〈t〉¬(a) ∧ ψ . Using induction, we get
Rcwv and M, v | 〈t〉¬θ(a, p)∧ψ ,(with p /∈ψ, t). Hence M,w | 〈〈c,ψ〉 · t〉¬θ(a, p)∧ ϕ . 
3.1. Back to our example
To formalise the derivation of Table 3, let the set of modalities representing the friends be A = {c, j,m, p, r}, let π = {q, z}
and let ρ = {Reﬂ(r), Reﬂ(m), Sup(c,m), Ser(c), Sup(kj, j)} and those atoms are axiomatically linked with their ‘natural’ modal
counterparts (see Table 1 and for Sup(kj, j) we take K j p → B j p). Let the resulting logic be K(A,π,ρ, I).
First of all, from (c′) and AxSup(kj, j) we derive K j Bmq → B j Bmq. Together with (e′) this gives (e′′): B j Bmq ∧ B j Bc¬q.
From (d′), i.e., B jSer(c) and AxSer(c) , we get B j(Bc¬q → ¬Bcq). Combining this with (e′′) gives B j Bmq ∧ B j¬Bcq, which is
equivalent to B j¬(Bmq → Bcq) (*).
From (b′) and AxSup(m,c) we derive B j Bm(Bmp → Bc p), for any p (**). Now, take the formula ψ = (Bmq → Bcq). From (*)
we have B j¬ψ , and from (**) we conclude B j Bmψ . In other words, we found a formula ψ for which B j¬(Bmψ →ψ). Now
using the contrapositive of axiom AxReﬂ(m) , we obtain B j¬Reﬂ(m), which, together with (a′), yields our conclusion ( f ′).
Now one may wonder whether this also warrants the conclusion ( f ). Note that we did ﬁnd a formula ψ above for which
we derived that Joe believes that Monica believes it wrongly, but this does not imply that Joey also believes that Ross is
mistaken regarding ψ . Also, although we now have ( f ′), as should be clear from Remark 1, B j¬Reﬂ(r) and B j¬∀ϕ(Brϕ → ϕ)
are not the same thing. However, what we do have is the following. Let ϕ be (a′)∧ (b′)∧ (c′)∧ (d′)∧ (e′), and let s be B j ,
then what we have proven now is
K(A,π,ρ, I)  ϕ → B j¬Reﬂ(r) (3)
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not (doxastically) possible. If we now add (g′) = Ser( j) (Joey’s beliefs are consistent) to our assumptions ϕ′ = ϕ ∧ (g′), we
obtain from (3):
K(A,π,ρ, I)  ϕ′ → M j¬Reﬂ(r) (4)
which, with rule R1, gives that, for any p not occurring in ϕ′ , ϕ′ ∧ M j(Br p ∧ ¬p) is consistent, i.e., we can assume that for
some p, Joey considers it possible that Ross is mistaken in his beliefs regarding that p.
It is worth noting how the axiomatisation makes it possible that some relational atoms (and hence some ﬁrst-order
frame properties) only hold in the scope of a modal operator (like in property (a′) and (b′) for example): the axiom Ax
and rule R do not require that some relational properties hold, they only specify what should be the case if they hold.
3.2. Completeness
In this section we show completeness of the axiomatisation, by the standard method of constructing a canonical model.
However, to ensure that the points (maximal consistent sets) in this model are closed under the new inference rule (cf. rule
R1), we have to ensure that those sets are fully witnessed, as deﬁned below. We also present a formulation of the condition
that we need to impose on the formulas θ(a, p) to make the completeness proof work: we will later, in Section 3.3 dwell
on this condition further.
Deﬁnition 8. A theory Γ is a set of formulas. For π a set of propositional atoms, Γ is a π -theory if all propositional atoms
in Γ are from π . Given a logic L, a theory Γ is L-consistent if ⊥ cannot be derived from Γ using the axioms and inference
rules of L. A theory Γ is a maximal L-consistent π -theory if it is consistent and no π -theory  is L-consistent while at
the same time Γ ⊂ . For a logic K(A,π,ρ, I), a set of formulas Γ is a witnessed π -theory if for every (a) and every
〈s〉¬ (a) ∈ Γ , there are atoms p such that 〈s〉¬θ(a, p) ∈ Γ , where (a) and θ(a, p) are axiomatically linked. If Γ is not
witnessed, then a formula 〈s〉¬ (a) for which there is no 〈s〉¬θ(a, p) ∈ Γ , is called a defect for the theory Γ . Finally, Γ
is said to be fully witnessed, if it is witnessed and for every formula of the form 〈s〉ϕ , either that formula or its negation is
in Γ .
Lemma 2 (Extension Lemma). Let Σ be a K(A,π,ρ, I)-consistent π -theory. Let π ′ ⊇ π be an extension of π by a countable set of
propositional variables. Then there is a maximal K(A,π ′,ρ, I)-consistent, witnessed π ′-theory Σ ′ extending Σ .
Before we give a proof, we ﬁrst deﬁne some languages.
Deﬁnition 9. Let the set of agents A, the set of atoms π and the set of relational atoms ρ be ﬁxed. Let L(A,π,ρ) be
as in Deﬁnition 1. Let π0 = {p0, p1, . . .} be a set of fresh atomic variables, i.e., π ∩ π0 = ∅ and let π ′ = π ∪ π0. Let
πn = π ∪ {pi | i  n}. Deﬁne Ln to be L(A,πn,ρ), and let Lω be L(A,π ′,ρ). A theory  ⊆ Σ is called an approximation if
for some n it is a consistent πn-theory. For such a theory, and any number k, the sequence p = 〈pn+1, . . . , pn+k〉 is a new
sequence p for  if n is the least number such that  is a πn-theory.
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume an enumeration of ψ0,ψ1, . . . of all formulas of the form 〈s〉¬  (a), where s is a pseudo-
modality and (a) ∈ ρ . Deﬁne
+ =
{
∪ {〈s〉¬θ(a, p)} where p is a new sequence for, and 〈s〉¬ (a) is the ﬁrst defect for if this exists
 otherwise
Clearly, by Ax , the set + is consistent when  is and hence, if  is an approximation, so is + . To deﬁne the extension




Σ2n ∪ {ϕn} if this is consistent






By construction, Σ ′ is a maximal K(A,π,ρ, I)-consistent, witnessed π ′-theory extending Σ . 
Deﬁnition 10 (Canonical model). Given A, π , ρ and I , we deﬁne the canonical model Mc = (Wc, Rc, I, V c) for the logic
K(A,π,ρ, I) as follows, where π ′ is as in Lemma 2:
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• RcaΓ iff for all ϕ ∈Lω it holds that if [a]ϕ ∈ Γ , then ϕ ∈• I is given as a parameter of the logic
• V cp = {Γ | p ∈ π ′ ∩ Γ }
Lemma 3 (Existence Lemma). Let Γ be a maximal K(A,π ′,ρ, I)-consistent witnessed π ′-theory, with 〈b〉ϕ ∈ Γ . Then there is a
maximal K(A,π ′,ρ, I)-consistent witnessed π ′-theory  with Γ Rcb.
Proof. Let ϕ0,ϕ1, . . . be an enumeration of all formulas of the form 〈s〉¬ (a). Deﬁne the following sequence Y0, Y1, . . . of




Y2n ∪ {ϕn} if 〈b〉(yn ∧ ϕn) ∈ Γ







σ | [b]σ ∈ Γ }
Here, the operation o is deﬁned as follows. First of all, if ¬ϕn is added to Y2n+1, then Y o2n+1 = Y2n+1. Next, suppose
ϕn = 〈s〉¬ (a) was added to Y2n+1. This means that 〈b〉(yn∧〈s〉¬ (a)) ∈ Γ , i.e., 〈b, yn, s〉¬ (a) ∈ Γ . Since Γ is witnessed,
we have 〈b, yn, s〉¬θ(a, p) ∈ Γ for some p, and we put Y o2n+1 = Y2n+1 ∪ {〈s〉¬θ(a, p)}.
Clearly, Y is fully witnessed. We claim Y is consistent as well, for suppose not, that is, there is a ﬁnite set of formulas
from Y that together imply ⊥. Let k be the biggest index for which we need a formula from Yk to derive this contradiction.
Then we have (yk ∧ α) → ⊥, for some α in {σ | [b]σ ∈ Γ }, but this contradicts the facts that 〈b〉yk ∧ [b]α ∈ Γ and that Γ
is consistent.
Finally, take a maximal consistent set  around Y : clearly this set is witnessed (since by construction of Y , for every
formula of the form 〈s〉¬ (a), a decision whether this formula or its negation should be included, is already made for Y ).
Obviously, we have RcbΓ. 
At this point, we should mention that although the deﬁnition of canonical model is similar to the standard deﬁnition in
modal logic blackburnml), the domain of the model of Deﬁnition 10 is not the set of all maximal consistent sets, rather, it
is the set of all such sets that are witnessed. The consequences of this fact will be discussed in Section 3.3. To prove our
coincidence lemma below, we will now assume that θ(a, p) is locally good, in the following sense.
Deﬁnition 11. Let the logic K(A,π,ρ, I) be given, θ(a, p) be a modal formula, (a) ∈ ρ a relational atom, Θ(a)(x) a ﬁrst
order formula and I : ρ →L1(A,X ). Assume that (a) and θ(a, p) are connected through the axiom Ax and R .
1. We say that θ(a, p) is locally good for Θ(a)(x) iff
(a) θ(a, p) locally deﬁnes Θ(a)(x), and
(b) Let Mc be any canonical model obtained as in Deﬁnition 10. Then if Γ ∈ Wc contains all instances of θ(a, p), then
Θ(a)(Γ ) holds in the model Mc .
2. We ﬁnally say that the four-tuple 〈θ(a, p),(a), I,Θ(a)(x)〉 is in local harmony if
(a) θ(a, p) is locally good for Θ(a)(x), and
(b) I semantically links θ(a, p) and (a) through Φ(x).
Lemma 4 (Coincidence Lemma). Let Mc be deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 10 and suppose for every  ∈ ρ there are purely modal formulas
θ(a, p) and a ﬁrst order formula Θ(a)(x) such that the tuple 〈θ(a, p),(a), I,Θ(a(x))〉 is in local harmony. Then
For all ϕ ∈ L(A,π,ρ),Γ ∈ Wc: Mc,Γ | ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ
Proof. For propositional variables this holds by deﬁnition, and the Boolean connectives are immediate. For ϕ =(a), sup-
pose (a) ∈ Γ . By Ax and US, all instances of θ(a, p) are in Γ as well. By items 1b and 2b of Deﬁnition 11, we then
have I((a))(Γ ), which by truth deﬁnition, yields Mc,Γ |(a). Conversely, suppose (a) /∈ Γ , then ¬ (a) ∈ Γ , and, by
construction of Γ , for some p, we have ¬θ(a, p) ∈ Γ . Since θ(a, p) is locally good, it follows from items 1a and 2b of
Deﬁnition 11, that it is not the case that I((a))(Γ ) holds, i.e., Mc,Γ | ¬ (a).
The modal case is standard: let ϕ ∈ L(A,π,ρ) be ϕ = [b]ψ . Let Γ ∈ Wc and suppose Mc,Γ | [b]ψ . We now claim
that [b]ψ ∈ Γ , for suppose not, that is, suppose 〈b〉¬ψ ∈ Γ . With Lemma 3 we ﬁnd a maximal consistent witnessed  for
which RcbΓ and ¬ψ ∈. By induction and the fact that ψ,¬ψ ∈L(A,π,ρ) we also have Mc, | ¬ψ which contradicts
Mc,Γ | [b]ψ . So {α | [b]α ∈ Γ } ∪ {¬ψ} is not L-consistent and we have {α | [b]α ∈ Γ }  ψ and hence Γ  [b]ψ and
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Mc, |ψ . Since  was arbitrary, we have RcbΓ. 
Theorem 2. Let the logic K(A,π,ρ, I) be given as in Deﬁnition 7, and suppose for every  ∈ ρ there are purely modal formulas
θ(a, p) and a ﬁrst order formula Θ(a)(x) such that the tuple 〈θ(a, p),(a), I,Θ(a(x))〉 is in local harmony. Then K(A,π,ρ, I) is
sound and complete with respect to the class ofK(A,π,ρ, I) models.
Proof. Soundness is dealt with in Theorem 1. For completeness, let ϕ ∈ L(A,π,ρ) be such that K(A,π,ρ, I)  ¬ϕ . By
Lemma 2, {ϕ} can be extended to a maximal Lω-consistent witnessed theory Γ . By Lemma 4, we then have Mc,Γ | ϕ ,
and hence | ¬ϕ which completes the proof. 
3.3. Discussion and an extension of the completeness proof
In a nutshell, our completeness proof builds a model for maximal witnessed theories Γ . Every consistent formula ϕ can
be embedded in such a theory, and the construction makes sure that for every 〈s〉¬ (a) ∈ Γ , there are witnessing atoms
p such that 〈s〉¬θ(a, p) ∈ Γ . Our canonical model hence does not contain all maximal consistent sets, but only those that
are fully witnessed. Such a model is called a thinned out canonical model in [12].
In modal logics that extend K with an axiom ϕ , the completeness proof for K+ ϕ typically builds the canonical model
from all maximal consistent sets, and this construction works for axioms ϕ that are canonical for some ﬁrst order property
Φ(x) (see also [3, Chapter 5] for a further discussion). Completeness of K+ϕ is then obtained with respect to those frames
of K that moreover satisfy Φ .
For our set-up, rather than canonicity, we require a property given in Deﬁnition 11. Note that our frames do not globally
inherit the ﬁrst order property Θ(a), but instead, at every point Γ in the canonical model where θ(a, p) holds, we also
have the property Θ(a).
It appears1 there is a rich modal literature on proving completeness when having a thinned out canonical model like
ours. A general way to prove completeness for such logics is presented in [12] (which in turn, is based on reports that
appear as the ﬁrst chapter in [11]). We will not present the details here: it would involve the notion of general frames.
Our proof shows that for the kind of model we deﬁne, the notion of θ(a, p) being locally good (Deﬁnition 11) works to
prove completeness. It might be cumbersome to check this notion for every θ(a, p) separately, but luckily enough, from
[12,11], it follows that our construction works for a class of formulas θ(a, p) that are called locally r-persistent (again, this
notion is deﬁned in terms of general frames, we refer to [12,11,30]). For an example of a formula that is canonical but not
r-persistent, see [30].
A systematic characterisation of (locally) r-persistent formulas is still lacking, but [22, Theorem 2.4.7] ensures that shal-
low formulas, i.e., modal formulas in which every occurrence of a propositional variable is in the scope of at most one modal
operator are r-persistent. Moreover, [12, p. 182] mentions that ‘many well-known formula axiomatising natural frame con-
ditions like reﬂexivity, symmetry, transitivity, linearity etc. are locally r-consistent’.
So the fact that r-persistence of θ(a, p) implies that θ(a, p) is locally good for some ﬁrst order Θ(a)(x) implies that our
completeness proof works whenever θ(a, p) is r-persistent. It moreover guarantees the following ‘modular’ completeness
result.
Theorem 3. Consider the logic K(A,π,ρ, I) and add a number of r-persistent formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn as axioms to it: call the result K′ .
Suppose ϕi locally deﬁnes Φi . Then K′ is complete with respect to frames that satisfy Φi (i  n).
Proof. For every axiom ϕi , introduce a new relational atom ϕi which is added as an axiom to the logic, and also add an
axiom and inference rule that axiomatically link ϕi and ϕi . Our completeness proof works when having several relational
atoms  associated with a formula θ(a, p) that is locally good for I(). Since r-persistence of ϕi implies being locally
good for Φi , we obtain a model such that every set Γ that contains ϕi satisﬁes Φi(Γ ), and moreover, since ϕi is added
as an axiom, the whole model satisﬁes Φ . This completes the proof. 
We will see an immediate application of Theorem 3 in the next section.
Our inference rule R is reminiscent of an inference rule for irreﬂexivity [8]. This rule for irreﬂexivity triggered a ﬂurry
of papers on studying similar ‘unorthodox rules’. We only mention here [11,30,12], which establish some general complete-
ness results, technically similar to the one presented here. The paper [30] calls such rules ‘non-ξ rules’ and [12] calls them
‘context-dependent rules’, because of the similarity between such rules and context-dependent rules in generating gram-
mars. Also, our use of pseudo-modalities has ancestors: (often in combination with the kind of ‘unorthodox rules’ above),
they are used in [12,30] as ‘universal forms’, in [9] as ‘admissible forms’ and were already present as a prototype in [8].
They also play a similar role as does the ‘pasting’ of a subformula next to an occurrence of a speciﬁed one in [6] to prove
the completeness of the D (difference) operator.
1 We are indebted to one of the reviewers to point this out to us.
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the work presented in this paper is a ﬁrst general approach to local properties in models. Although [12] also pays attention
to local issues, all the frames obtained there are deﬁned globally. Theorem 4.1 in [12] presents both a generalisation (it is not
just about rules with relational atoms) and a specialisation (it is not about I-frames) of our Theorem 2. In our terminology,
[12, Theorem 4.1] supposes that we have a formula ϕ that locally deﬁnes α(x), and a formula ψ which is locally r-persistent
and locally deﬁning β(x). It then assumes an inference rule like R , where θ(a, p) is replaced by ϕ and (a) by ψ . If
such a rule is added to a logic L which only has r-persistent axioms, then the resulting logic is sound and complete with
respect to frames of L that moreover satisfy ∀x(α(x) → β(x)). In our case, the α and β are equivalent, so that indeed we
keep the frames of the underlying logic L. In other words, our logic does not demand anything about a frame globally, it
only requires that if locally all instances of θ(a, p) are true, the ‘corresponding’ I((a)) must hold as well.
3.4. Outlook
We have so far assumed that the only properties of (a) are those speciﬁed by the axiom A and rule R . However, one
can add other connections between (a) and modal formulas, or between different 1(a1) and 2(a2) atoms. For instance,
in an epistemic logic, one could add the axiom scheme
Reﬂ(a,a)→ Trans(a,a,a) (5)
Adding an axiom like (5) for an agent a has the effect that whenever a’s knowledge is veridical, a is also positively
introspective. I.e., we would have, semantically, that whenever M, s | Kaϕ → ϕ , for all ϕ , then also M, s | Kaϕ → KaKaϕ ,
for all ϕ . This again is a property that cannot be expressed in standard, ‘global’ modal logic. As a second example, in an
epistemic temporal modal logic, one could add an axiom like
Trans(a,a,a)→(Trans(a,a,a)∧ Eucl(a,a,a)) (6)
saying that whenever agent a is positively introspective, he will eventually also become negatively introspective. As a third
example, a simple axiom like
Ser(a)→ Ser(b) (7)
in a doxastic setting would mean that whenever a’s beliefs are consistent, those of b must be consistent as well.
It is possible to view some standard results in modal logic concerning completeness of modal systems as special cases
of our local logic. If the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisﬁed, and one adds a (a) as an axiom, one immediately gets
completeness with respect to the class of models that satisfy I(θ(a, p)). For instance, in a logic with axioms and rules
for Reﬂ(a), adding Reﬂ(a) itself as an axiom gives a modal system that is sound and complete with respect to the class of
reﬂexive Kripke models! Of course, this amounts to the same thing as adding θ(a, p), as is directly clear from rule R (take
α = ⊥).
Finally, it is important to realise that, although we presented the axioms for the underlying logic (the formulas ϕi that
we assumed to be canonical) and the relational atoms as two independent layers, the interaction properties between the
modalities and the relational atoms may be automatically ‘imported’. For the case of epistemic logic S5 with at least two
agents and the Sup(a,b) atom for instance, one can derive that certain Sup(a,b) statements cannot go unnoticed by the
agents! This will now be discussed in the next section.
4. Comparative (epistemic) logic
We will now focus on an example of a modal logic, called comparative logic (CL), which has one type of relational atom
, namely Sup. From now on, we will write a  b for Sup(a,b), and b  a will denote the same. To motivate our notation,
note that
M,w | a b iff Ra(w)⊇ Rb(w) iff M,w | b a iff M,w | Rb(w)⊆ Ra(w)
We also write a  b for ¬(a  b). Moreover, we will write both a  b and b ≺ a for (a  b) ∧ ¬(b  a). So a  b means
‘every a-successor is a b-successor’, and a ≺ b means ‘every a-successor is a b-successor, and some b-successor is not an
a-successor’. In the second part of this section, we will then interpret our formulas on multi-agent S5-models (‘epistemic’
models). So then a  b stands for ‘agent a considers a larger set of worlds possible than agent b’, informally ‘b knows at
least as much as a’. We will start by adding the atom to the logic K(A,π,ρ, I). This is the logic CL: comparative logic. This
is not yet an epistemic logic.
4.1. Comparative logic
Deﬁnition 12 (Comparative logic). Comparative logic, CL(A,π), is the logic that is obtained from K(A,π,ρ, I) by choosing as
ρ the singleton consisting of relational atom =  (i.e., we have all a b for a,b ∈ A, in the language); where we stipulate
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that I(a b) = ∀xy(Rbxy ⇒ Raxy) and, ﬁnally, that θ(a,b, p) = [a]p → [b]p. In CL(A,π), the atom a b and [a]p → [b]p
are axiomatically linked through the axiom
Ax = a b →
([a]p → [b]p)
and inference rule R:
R = From [s]
([a]p → [b]p) infer [s](a b)(p not in s)
which is equivalent to:
R = From 〈s〉¬
([a]p → [b]p)→ ϕ infer 〈s〉¬(a b)→ ϕ(p not in ϕ or s)
We write CL for derivability in CL(A,π). The language C L(A,π) of comparative logic is deﬁned as L(A,π, {}).
Corollary 1. CL(A,π) is sound and complete with respect toK(A,π,ρ, I)
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 2 on page 143. 
In this weakest modal logic with the symbol , we can already derive ‘expected’ properties of :
Proposition 1. The following hold:
1. CL a a
2. CL (a b ∧ b c)→ a c
3. CL a  b → 〈a〉
Proof. 1. Since [a]p → [a]p is a theorem, we have CL ¬([a]p → [a]p) → ⊥ (where ⊥ = (q ∧ ¬q)). Applying the rule R to
this gives CL ¬(a a)→ ⊥. The latter is equivalent to CL a a.
2. Using Ax , we have CL (a b∧ b  c)→ (([a]p → [b]p)∧ ([b]p → [c]p)). This implies CL (a b∧ b  c)→ ([a]p →
[c]p). We can now use rule R2 (with s the empty sequence) to conclude CL (a b ∧ b c)→ a c.
3. By deﬁnition, a  b equals (a  b) ∧ ¬(b  a). We also have CL ¬([b]p → [a]p) → 〈a〉. Using R we then get
CL ¬(b  a)→ 〈a〉. Using the deﬁnition above, we then get CL a  b → 〈a〉. 
Our next example reminds the reader that a b and [a]ϕ → [b]ϕ are not the same.
Example 3. Suppose Γ is the set of formulas
Γ = {[a]ϕ → [b]ϕ | ϕ ∈ L}∪ {a  b}
Then it is well possible that Γ is satisﬁable, and, by soundness, consistent. For satisﬁability, take the following model M =
〈W , R, I, V 〉, with W = {w,u, v}, Ra = {(w,u)} and Rb = {(w, v)}, I(a  b)(x) = ∀y(Rbxy ⇒ Raxy) and, ﬁnally, V p = {u, v}
for all p. (See Fig. 3.) In this model, we have M,u | ϕ iff M, v | ϕ for all ϕ , and hence we have M,w | [a]ϕ → [b]ϕ , and
yet we do not have Rb(w)⊆ Ra(w), i.e. M,w | a  b.
To further emphasise the non-standard behaviour of our modal language, we state two more negative (and one positive)
results. First let us brieﬂy revisit some modal semantic notions.
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the following holds: (‘atomic’) for all p ∈ P , if Rww ′ then w ∈ V (p) iff w ′ ∈ V ′(p) (‘forth’) if Rww ′ and if for some v ∈ W
and some a ∈ A one has Rawv , then there is a v ′ ∈ W ′ such that R ′aw ′v ′ and Rvv ′ and, ﬁnally (‘back’) if Rww ′ and if for
some v ′ ∈ W ′ and some a ∈ A one has R ′aw ′v ′ , then there is a v ∈ W such that Rawv and Rvv ′ . If there is a bisimulation
between M and M ′ with Rww’, we write M,w ∼= M ′,w ′ .
A special case of a bisimulation is obtained by unraveling a model (M,w) into a model (M ′,w) as follows.
Given W and a set of agents A let W ′ be all the ﬁnite paths in M from w , i.e., states w ′ in W ′ are of the
form w ′ = 〈w1,a1,w2,a2, . . . ,wn,anwn+1〉 such w1 = w and for all i  n, in M one has Rai wiwi+1. Let lst(w ′) =
lst(〈w1,a1,w2,a2, . . . ,wn,anwn+1〉) = wn+1 (i.e., lst selects the last member of a ﬁnite list). Put w ′ ∈ V ′(p) iff lst(w ′) ∈
V (p), and R ′aw ′v ′ if v ′ = 〈w1,a1,w2,a2, . . . ,wn,anwn+1,a,u〉 for some u ∈ W .
If there are no relational atoms we have a standard multimodal logical language: for L(A,π,∅) we write L(A,π). In
other words, compared to CL(A,π)=L(A,π, {}), L(A,π) is the language without the a b formulas.
Lemma 5.
1. Bisimulations preserve L(A,π) [3, p. 66]:
If M,w ∼= M ′,w ′ then for all ϕ ∈L(A,π): M,w | ϕ iff M ′w ′ | ϕ .
2. Unravelings preserve L(A,π) [3, p. 63]:
If M ′,w is an unraveling of M,w then for all ϕ ∈L(A,π): M,w | ϕ iff M ′,w | ϕ .
3. Bisimulations do not preserve CL(A,π)
4. Unravellings do not preserve CL(A,π)
Proof. We only show items 3 and 4. Take the model M ′ = 〈W ′, R ′, V ′〉 such that W ′ = {w ′, z′} and R ′a = R ′b = {(w ′, z′)}.
(See Fig. 3.) Then for M deﬁned in Example 3, it is clear that M,w ∼= M ′,w ′ , yet M ′,w ′ | b  a while M,w | ¬(b  a).
For item 4, consider the unraveling M ′′ = 〈W ′′, R ′′, V ′′〉 of M ′ , where W ′′ = {w ′, 〈w ′,a, z′〉, 〈w ′,b, z′〉}. (See Fig. 3.) It is
easily veriﬁed that M ′,w ′ | a  b ∧ b  a while M ′′,w ′ | ¬(a  b) ∧ ¬(b  a). The latter in fact shows a validity for any
unravelled model (for a = b). 
To show that CL(A,π) is not completely misbehaved, we show that there are modiﬁed kinds of bisimulation and unrav-
eling that do preserve the language. The idea is simple: instead of looking at individual steps we look at complete coalitions
for which two states are accessible.
Deﬁnition 14. Let for a coalition C ⊆ A, relation RC be such that RC wv iff for all i ∈ A: (Riwv iff i ∈ C ). Note the second
occurrence of ‘iff’ in this deﬁnition: it follows that for every w and v there is exactly one coalition C ⊆ A for which RC wv .
Given two models M = 〈W , R, V 〉 and M ′ = 〈W ′, R ′, V ′, 〉, a relation R⊆ W ×W is called a coalitional bisimulation if the
following holds: (‘atomic’) for all p ∈ π , if Rww ′ then w ∈ V (p) iff w ′ ∈ V ′(p) (‘forth’) if Rww ′ and if for some v ∈ W and
some C ⊆ A one has RC wv , there is a v ′ ∈ W ′ such that R ′C w ′v ′ and Rvv ′ and, ﬁnally (‘back’) if Rww ′ and if for some
v ′ ∈ W ′ and some C ∈ A one has R ′C w ′v ′ , there is a v ∈ W such that RC wv and Rvv ′ . If there is a coalitional bisimulation
between M and M ′ with Rww ′ , we write M,w ∼=coal M ′,w ′ .
Let M,w with M = 〈W , R, V 〉 be given. A coalitional unraveling of M is a model M ′,w with M ′ = 〈W ′, R ′, V ′〉, and
where W ′ consists of all paths 〈w1,C1,w2, . . . ,wn,Cn,wn+1〉 such that w1 = w and for all i  n, one has RC wiwi+1. V ′ is
deﬁned as in the case for (ordinary) unravelings, and R ′C w ′v ′ if v ′ = 〈w1,C1,w2,C2, . . . ,wn,Cnwn+1,C,u〉 for some u ∈ W
and C ⊆ A.
Coalitional unravelings (M ′,w) of (M,w) respect access for coalitions of agents, in the following sense: for all C , R ′C w ′v ′
iff RClst(w ′)lst(v ′). The proof of the following is now a straightforward extension of the proofs of items 1 and 2 of Lemma 5
and therefore omitted:
Theorem 4 (Preservation). We have the following.
1. If M,w ∼=coal M ′,w ′ then for all ϕ ∈ CL(A,π): M,w | ϕ iff M ′w ′ | ϕ .
2. If M ′,w is a coalitional unraveling of M,w then for all ϕ ∈ CL(A,π): M,w | ϕ iff M ′,w | ϕ .
Proposition 2. A coalitional bisimulation is a bisimulation: if M,w ∼=coal M ′,w ′ then M,w ∼= M ′,w ′ .
Proof. A proof is needed, because the back and forth requirements for the bisimulation relation are not special cases of
those for coalitional bisimulation, as Ra is not the same as (in coalitional bisimulations) R{a}: the latter links states with
only an a-arrow between them, the former links states with at least an a-arrow between them.
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Assume Rcoal: M,w ∼=coal M ′,w ′ . We show that also Rcoal: M,w ∼= M ′,w ′ . ‘Atoms’ is trivial. ‘Forth’: let a ∈ A, u ∈ M ,
and u′ ∈ M ′ . Assume there is a v ∈ M such that Rauv and Rcoaluu′ . Agent a must occur in some coalition C for which RCuv
(there is a C such that {a} ⊆ C ⊆ A and RC non-empty). From RCuv and Rcoaluu′ follows that there is a v ′ ∈ M ′ such that
R ′Cu′v ′ and Rcoal vv ′ . From R ′Cu′v ′ and a ∈ C follows R ′au′v ′ . ‘Back’: similar. 
The notion of coalitional bisimulation is in fact too strong to characterise preservation, i.e., the converse direction of
item 1 of Theorem 4 does not hold. To see this, take the two models M,w1 and M ′,w ′1 of Fig. 11 (in fact, all accessibility
relations are equivalence relations: the formal deﬁnition of the models is in the proof of Theorem 8). We will argue in
that proof that M,w1 and M ′,w ′1 satisfy the same formulas, but it is easy to see that they are not coalition bisimilar:
from w1, there is an {a}-successor that satisﬁes ¬p, but this is not true for w ′1, nor for w ′2. But this also suggest a trivial
relaxation of our requirements for a coalitional bisimulation: in order for a state M ′,w ′ to have the same theory as M,w1
in Fig. 11, rather than requiring that M ′,w ′ needs to have an {a}-successor to a ¬p world, we should require that (i) M ′,w ′
is bisimilar with M,w in the sense of Deﬁnition 13, and (ii), the formula b  a is true in M ′,w ′ (and it should agree with
M,w1 on all relevant -formulas).
Deﬁnition 15. Let the models M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 and M ′ = 〈W ′, R ′, I ′, V ′〉 be two models for the same agents A, propositional
variables π and relational atoms ρ . A relation R⊆ W × W ′ is called an extended bisimulation if
• R is a bisimulation (in the sense of Deﬁnition 13).
• If for w ∈ W ,w ′ ∈ W ′ we have Rww ′ , then I((a))(w) iff I ′((a))(w ′) for all (a) ∈ ρ .
An extended bisimulation is moreover called natural if it also satisﬁes
• If for w ∈ W ,w ′ ∈ W ′ we have Rww ′ , then I((a))(w)= I ′((a))(w ′) for all (a) ∈ ρ .
As an example, consider the models M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉, M ′ = 〈W ′, R, I, V ′〉 and M ′′ = 〈W ′′, R ′′, I ′′, V ′′〉 of Fig. 4. Let V , V ′
and V ′′ be such that exactly the same propositional variables are true in all worlds. Suppose there is only one relational
atom (a) in the language, and I((a)(x)) = Raxx, I ′((a)(x)) = ∃!yRaxy and I ′′((a)(x)) = Raxx. Then R= W × W ′ is an
extend bisimulation that is not natural (in M , (a) is interpreted as Ra being reﬂexive, in M ′ as R ′a being functional), while
R′ = W × W ′′ represents a natural extended bisimulation (in both models, (a) is interpreted as reﬂexivity). Note that
for I ′((a)(x)) we could even have taken ¬I((a)(x)). In particular, if N ′ is an unraveling a model N with a reﬂexive or
transitive relation Ra , then the two models bisimulate each other non-naturally by taking for instance I((a) to be Reﬂ(a)
or Trans(a), and I ′ its negation. To sum up, in an extended bisimulation, bisimulating worlds agree also on the truth of
relational atoms, while in a natural extended bisimulation, bisimulating worlds moreover agree on the meaning of such
atoms.
The following is an easy extension of well-known results in modal logic. Note that it is about general languages
L(A,π,ρ), not just about the comparative language of CL(A,π).
Lemma 6.
1. Extended bisimulations preserve L(A,π,ρ), i.e., if there is an extended bisimulation between M,w and M ′,w ′ , then for all
ϕ ∈L(A,π,ρ), M,w | ϕ iff M ′,w ′ | ϕ .
2. For ﬁnite models, we also have the converse: if two ﬁnite models agree on formulas formL(A,π,ρ), then there exists an extended
bisimulation between them.
Proof. Similar to the modal case (cf. [3]), when one treats relational atoms as propositional variables. 
4.2. Comparative epistemic logic
We will now specialise our case study with (a,b) = a b to epistemic logic. We will write Kaϕ (rather than [a]ϕ) for
‘agent a knows ϕ ’. Moreover, Maϕ will be short for ¬Ka¬ϕ .
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ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kaϕ | a b
Deﬁnition 16 (Comparative epistemic logic). Let CEL(A,π), comparative epistemic logic, be the logic that is obtained from
CL(A,π) by adding the following three knowledge axioms.
T Kaϕ → ϕ
4 Kaϕ → KaKaϕ
5 ¬Kaϕ → Ka¬Kaϕ
Moreover, since we assume ρ = {a  b | a,b ∈ A} we have the following specialised axiom and rule (see Table 4 on
page 139; we recall that s is a pseudo-modality):
Ax a b → (Kap → Kbp)
R From 〈s〉(Kap ∧ ¬Kbp)→ ϕ infer 〈s〉¬(a b → ϕ)
As in CL, we assume in CEL that I(a  b) = ∀y(Rbxy ⇒ Raxy) and, ﬁnally, that θ(a,b, p) = Kap → Kbp. So, in
CEL(A,π), we have axioms that guarantee that a  b and Kap → Kbp are axiomatically linked. We will write CEL for
derivability in CEL(A,π).
Models for CEL(A,π) will be ordinary S5-models, i.e., models of the kind M = 〈W , R, I, V 〉 with the constraint that for
each a ∈ A, Ra is an equivalence relation. Call this set of models S5(A,π,ρ, I).
Theorem 5. CEL(A,π) is sound and complete with respect to S5(A,π,ρ, I).
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 3 and the observation that axiom T is r-persistent and deﬁnes reﬂexivity, axiom
4 if r-persistent and deﬁnes transitivity, and 5 r-persistent and deﬁnes Euclidicity (for the r-persistence argument, see [12]).
Moreover, a relation has those three properties iff it is an equivalence relation. Finally, Ax is also r-persistent, since it is
shallow [22]). 
The technical results in the previous sections suggest that the inﬁnite scheme∧
ϕ∈L
(Kaϕ → Kbϕ) (8)
is captured by the formula a b. However, we have also seen that, would we allow for inﬁnite conjunctions, then although
we would have  (a b)→∧ϕ∈L(Kaϕ → Kbϕ), this implication can in general not be reversed.
Related to this, it is worth noting that the notion of ‘knowing more than’ cannot be captured in the language of CEL.
Although one might suspect that ‘b knows more than a’ is captured by a  b, the latter only says that every state considered
possible by b is also considered possible by a and, moreover, some states are considered possible by a and not by b. However, these
latter states can all be bisimilar to states that both agents consider possible, in which case both agents would know the
same.
The following theorem summarises some of our discussion so far.
Theorem 6. Let (M,w) be a pointed CELmodel. Let Ψ (w) denote that in w, agent b knows at least what a knows:
Ψ (w) : ∀ϕ((M,w) | Kaϕ → Kbϕ)
Furthermore, let Φ(w) denote that at w, agent b knows strictly more than a:
Φ(w) : ∀ϕ((M,w) | Kaϕ → Kbϕ) & ∃ψ((M,w) | Kbψ ∧ ¬Kaψ)
1. If (M,w) | a b, then Ψ (w);
2. The converse of item 1 does not hold in general;
3. (M,w) | a  b does not imply Φ(w) in general;
4. Φ(w) does not in general imply (M,w) | a  b.
Proof. All items, except item 1, require a counter-example.
1. This follows from Ax and soundness of CEL.
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Fig. 6. In this model M all states satisfy the same atoms.
2. This follows from Example 3 on page 145.
3. Take the model M of Fig. 6 (recall that we do not draw reﬂexive arrows in our ﬁgures). That is, W = {u, v,w}, Ra =
W × W , Rb = {(v,w), (w, v)} ∪ {(x, x) | x ∈ W }, I interprets  as expected and V is such that V (p) is either W or ∅,
for all p ∈ π (so all worlds agree on propositional variables). An easy induction on formulas ϕ from LCEL shows that
M,w | ϕ iff M,u | ϕ iff M, v | ϕ
This is true by deﬁnition for ϕ ∈ π , and it is also true for relational atoms: a b is true in all worlds, and b a is true
in no world. The cases for negation, conjunction and knowledge formulas then follow directly. To conclude, we have
(M,w) | a  b but Φ(w) is false in M .
4. See Fig. 5. We will not formally deﬁne the model M depicted in this ﬁgure, but it is easy to see that for all i, j ∈ Z, and
all ϕ , we have M, xi | ϕ iff M, x j | ϕ . This is because the two models (M, xi) and (M, x j) are not just bisimilar, they
are isomorphic! From this if follows that for all ϕ , (M,w0) | Kaϕ → Kbϕ . Because if (M,w0) | Kaϕ , then ϕ holds in
w0, x0 and u0, so by the claim just mentioned we have that ϕ holds in w0 and u1, and hence (M,w0) | Kbϕ . 
It would be interesting to study under which conditions the counter-examples that perfectly link  and ‘knowing at
least as much’, or between  and ‘knowing more’ fade away, in other words, under which circumstances there is a perfect
match between for instance  and ‘knowing more’. A natural condition for this seems to be the case where, for any agent
a, and any world w , the set Ra(w) is deﬁnable in LCEL , that is, where there is a formula χa,w such that
M, v | χa,w iff v ∈ Ra(w)
It is easy to see how this addresses the negative results in Theorem 6. For item 2 for instance, if Ψ (w) holds, we have in
particular M,w | Kaχa,w → Kbχa,w and hence if Rbwu, then M,u | χa,w and hence u ∈ Ra(w), so that M,w | a b.
Examples where deﬁnability of successors is guaranteed are for instance obtained if we restrict our attention to the case
where the language has only ﬁnitely many atoms, and where the models are both image ﬁnite (every world has only ﬁnitely
many successors) and strongly extensional (see [3], this notion is also sometimes called bisimulation contraction), items 2 to 4
of Theorem 6 would not allow for a counter-example. Intuitively, a model is strongly extensional if it cannot contain fewer
worlds without changing its information content, i.e.: removing a state would mean changing the truth of some formula in
some other state. We leave a precise characterisation of classes of models where  and ‘knowing at least’ exactly match,
for future research.
In Proposition 1 we showed that some simple properties of  can be already derived in CL. An obvious question is
whether adding knowledge properties to the logic enables us to derive more properties of , in particular, whether it
induces interaction properties between the -operators and the knowledge operators. This is indeed the case.
Theorem 7. Let a and b agents. Then the following are validities in CEL.
1. a b ↔ Kb(a b)
2. ¬(a b)↔ Kb¬(a b)
3. a  b ↔ Kb(a  b)
4. a  b ↔ (Kb(a b)∧ Ka¬(b  a))
5. Kb(a b)∨ Kb¬(a b)
Proof. In the ﬁrst four cases, the right-to-left direction follows from the fact that we have reﬂexive models (or, equivalently,
since we have axiom T).
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then to prove that M, v | a  b. Let u be such that Rbvu, then to prove that Ravu. From Rbwv and Rbvu follows
Rbwu, as Rb is transitive. From assumption M,w | a b and Rbwv follows Rawv , and from M,w | a b and Rbwu
follows Rawu. From Rawv and Rawu and the Euclidicity of Ra now follows Ravu.
2. This follows from the ﬁrst item, using modal logical reasoning. Writing α for a b, the ﬁrst item implies that we have
| α → Kbα, and hence | ¬Kbα → ¬α. Applying necessitation and the K -axiom to the latter, we obtain | Kb¬Kbα →
Kb¬α (*). Since our models are reﬂexive, we have | ¬α → ¬Kbα. Applying negative introspection to the latter yields
| ¬α → Kb¬Kbα. Using this with (*) ﬁnally gives | ¬α → Kb¬α, i.e., | ¬(a b)→ Kb¬(a b).
3. This follows from the previous two items (and hence, since 2 follows from 1, it follows from 1). Suppose (M,w) | a  b.
This implies (M,w) | a b and hence, by item 1, then (M,w) | Kb(a b). Since (a  b) implies ¬(b  a), from item 2
we infer that M,w | Ka¬(b  a). Since M,w | a  b we have M,w | Kaψ → Kbψ for all ψ , and hence M,w |
Kb¬(b  a). In sum, we have M,w | Kb(a b)∧ Kb¬(b  a), which, by modal reasoning, yields M,w | Kb(a  b).
4. This follows from item 1, item 2, and the deﬁnition of a  b: note that the latter is deﬁned as (a b)∧ ¬(b  a), from
which, by item 1 we derive Kb(a b)∧ ¬(b a), and, by item 2, Kb(a b)∧ Ka¬(b  a).
5. Again, this follows directly from items 1 and 2, together with the validity of (a b)∨ ¬(a b). 
Theorem 7 states some facts about  on S5-models that at ﬁrst sight might seem remarkable. Roughly speaking, they
imply that if an agent b has at least the same (or more) information than agent a, agent b will know this. In particular,
item 1 of the theorem says that if b considers at most the states possible that a considers possible, b knows this. Item 3
states that if b only considers a strict subset of a’s alternatives, b knows this as well! This is particularly striking in cases
where a and b in fact know the same (this is for instance true in (M,w) of Fig. 6). In this model, note that agents a and
b know the same in (M,w). However, although both agents know exactly the same, both agents also know that agent b
considers less states possible than agent a! Item 2 then says that if b does not consider at most the states possible that
a considers possible, b must know this. In sum, the ﬁrst three items seem to suggest that no matter whether (i) b has at
least the information as a has, or (ii) has more information than a, or (iii) does not have at least the information that a has,
b will know this! Item 5 states that, for any agent b, if he compares his information state with an arbitrary agent a, then b
will know whether he has at least the same information as a or not. The following representation of S5-models and the
alternative notation when dealing with equivalence relations may also help the reader.
Remark 2. We give an alternative proof of Theorem 7 items 1 and 3, stressing the fact that we are dealing with equivalence
relations. For an S5-model M = 〈W , R, V , I〉, a world w ∈ W , and an agent a, let us write [a]w for {v ∈ W | Rawv}. Note
that, when v ∈ [w]a , then [w]a = [v]a . In the model M of Fig. 7, we have depicted four states, w , v , x and z. The set W is
partitioned in [w]a and [z]a (note that in fact there does not need to exists a z /∈ [w]a , in which case we would only have
one equivalence class for a). For agent b, we have only depicted one equivalence class [w]b , it does not matter how the
other classes for b are splitting up W . The existence of world x is only guaranteed in the second item below.
1. Let M,w | a  b. This means that [w]a ⊇ [w]b (1). In order to prove M,w | Kb(a  b) we need to show that for any
v such that v ∈ [w]b , we have that M, v | a  b, that is, [v]a ⊇ [v]b . Since v ∈ [w]b , we have [w]b = [v]b , which with
(1) gives [w]a ⊇ [v]b (2). Since v ∈ [w]b , with (1) we derive that v ∈ [w]a , and hence [v]a = [w]a . With (2) this gives
[v]a ⊇ [v]b .
The proof of item 3 of Theorem 7 is almost identical to that of the previous item: replace each occurrence of  by  and
each occurrence of ⊇ by ⊃.
Where our ﬁrst proof of Theorem 7 shows that transitivity and Euclidicity are suﬃcient to demonstrate the →-direction
of the items 1 and 3, we ﬁnally show that they are also necessary: see Fig. 8. In model M , we have (M,w) | M,w |
a  b ∧ ¬Kb(a  b) which, shows that both items 1 and 3 of Theorem 7 fail on reﬂexive transitive models. In N , we have
(N, v) | a  b ∧ ¬Kb(a  b), showing that Euclidicity on its own cannot guarantee Theorem 7 to hold. (There can be no
reﬂexive Euclidean model refuting Theorem 7, since those two conditions together ensure that the accessibility relation is
also transitive, i.e., an equivalence.)
Concentrating now on the agent a that has less information (i.e., who considers at least the states possible that b
considers possible), it turns out that a does not need to be aware of this. It seems somewhat ‘unfair’ that if a knows less
than b, a does not necessarily know that — at least in a (fair!) game-like setting one would expect the opposite: player
b may have an advantage (more information, more knowledge), but in order to place his bets player a should at least be
aware of his disadvantage (ignorance) compared to b. On the other hand, considering that these are typically incomplete
information games, from a’s perspective it may be gambling the possibility of being less informed than b against the
possibility of knowing more, which sounds more ‘fair’.
Example 4. Consider the model of Fig. 9 consisting of three states, where a cannot distinguish t from u whereas b cannot
distinguish s from t . In fact u is the case. In u it is true that a  b — in fact a knows indeed less than b, but a considers
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Fig. 8. In both (M,w) and (N, v), formula a  b ∧ ¬Kb(a b) holds.
Fig. 9. An S5-model with three states. The valuation is given above each state.
it possible that ¬(a  b), in which case the advantage of b would be less. Possibly a is willing to bet for the latter, even
though the former is really the case. This is like playing bridge and noting the signals exchanged between the opponents,
that if true may have revealed their better hand of cards, but they may also have been explicitly misinforming you by their
signals in order to confuse you. In any case, our model has (M,u) | a b∧¬Ka(a b): agent a is at most as informed as b
without knowing it. Note that we even have (M,u) | a  b ∧¬Ka(a  b): agent a is less informed than b without knowing
this.
It is of course well possible that each agent has a secret. In Fig. 9 for instance, we have
M, t | (Kap ∧ ¬Kbp)∧ (Kbq ∧ ¬Kaq)
Before looking at an example in CEL, consider the following property: ¬Kaϕ ∧∧i∈A((a  i) → Kiϕ). This expresses that a
does not know ϕ , but anybody who would know even a little bit more would know ϕ . In state u of the example above
we have that a does not know that q is false, but b, who knows ‘a little bit’ more (who considers only the actual state as
possible, one less than the two states considered possible by a) knows that q is false. So we have, in u:
¬Ka¬q ∧ (a  b → Kb¬q)
This notion of ‘knowing even a little bit more’ seems of independent interest on inﬁnite models, where the difference
between a’s ignorance and any other agent’s knowledge may be like the difference between a closed set and any open
approximation of that set.
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4.3. Comparative epistemic logic with public announcements
Being able to locally express that agent a knows at least what agent b knows is especially valuable if one can somehow
reason about change of knowledge, allowing one to express that it comes about that one player gets to know at least what
another knows. Dynamic epistemic logic ([27]) is a powerful formalism to reason about change within the object language.
Without going into the details of the logic, we will here focus on a particular case of dynamic epistemic logic, namely public
announcements, thereby focus on the semantical aspect of model restriction.
First, consider the two epistemic models in Fig. 10. Call the models M (left) and N (right). Model M represents a situation
where three players 1,2 and 3 each hold a card from a deck of cards Cards = {r,w,b}. A state with a name xyz represents a
situation where player 1 holds card x, player 2 holds y and player 3 holds z. We also assume atoms ri,wi,bi (i  3) where
for instance r2 is true in those situations where 2 holds the red card. Players only see their own card, and not the card of
the others (and this is common knowledge). Note that both models are image ﬁnite and strongly extensional: the worlds in
each model already differ in the valuations. This implies that we can here identify  with ‘knowing at least as much as’,
and  with ‘knowing more’.
In M we have for instance that
M, rwb | r1 ∧ K1r1 ∧ ¬K2r1 ∧ K1¬K2r1
I.e., if the deal is rwb, then 1 holds the red card, he knows this, but 2 does not know it, and, ﬁnally, 1 knows that 2 does
not know that 1 holds the red card.
Since every player knows a fact that the others don’t know (i.e., the face of their own card) we also have
M | ¬(1 2)∧ ¬(2 1)∧ K1¬(1 2)∧ K1K2¬(1 2)
which says that the information of players 1 and 2 is incomparable, and 1 knows that 2 does not know more than him:
1 even knows that 2 knows that 2 does not know more than 1.
However, now consider model N , which can be obtained from M as the effect of a public announcement that player 1
does not hold the white card, i.e., ¬w1. In other words, N is obtained from M by leaving out all those states where the
announcement (that ¬w1) is false. Said differently, N is the result of M when leaving out the states wrb and wbr. The
notation for this is N = M|¬w1 (N is M restricted to the ¬w1 worlds). We then obtain
N, rwb | 1 3∧ 2 3∧ M1(3 2)
This describes the situation that when the card deal is rwb, and somebody announces in public that 1 does not hold
the white card, that after that announcement, 3 knows more than 1 and than 2 (they both knew already the fact that
is announced), and 1 considers it possible that 2 holds the white card, in which situation 3  2 would hold after the
announcement.
Let us now consider a little closer how a system of comparative epistemic logic combined with public announcement
logic would look like. First of all, this would involve a language, which we call LCEL+PAL deﬁned as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kaϕ | a b | [ϕ]ϕ
where [ϕ]ψ is read as: ‘after the public announcement of ϕ , ψ is the case’. We have already discussed the semantics for
this: if M = 〈W , R, V , I〉, then
(M,w) | [ϕ]ψ iff (M,w) | ϕ implies (M|ϕ,w) |ψ
where M|ϕ is the model M restricted to those worlds that verify ϕ .
In such a combination, one would enable to communicate what in standard public announcement logic would require
an inﬁnite amount of communication (namely, as above, public announcement of Kaϕ → Kbϕ for all formulas ϕ in the
language!). The public announcement a  b has the effect that the local property that b knows at least what a knows
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Fig. 12. Two S5-models, the result of announcing ¬p in the models of Fig. 11.
becomes a global property. It is easy to see that [a b](Kaϕ → Kbϕ) is a validity, or, in other words, after an announcement
with a  b, Rb ⊆ Ra is common knowledge. (If [a  b](Kaϕ → Kbϕ) is a validity then also, as usual, [a  b]CA(Kaϕ →
Kbϕ).) The semantics for such a public announcement would be a standard model restriction to the worlds satisfying the
announced formula, in this case, to the worlds satisfying a b: M|a b = {s ∈ M | M, s | a b}.
The axiomatisation of public announcements in S5 is obtained by so-called reduction axioms (see [27] for a discussion).
Those axioms explain how public announcement can be reduced to statements in S5 that do not involve such announce-
ments. For instance, the reduction axiom for knowledge says that [ϕ]Kiψ (‘after announcement of ϕ , agent i knows ψ ’) is
equivalent to ϕ → Ki[ϕ]ψ . Using this axiom together with the other axioms (for conjunction and negation), we can ‘push’
the announcements operators [·] ‘inside’ the subformulas, and eventually, using the axioms for announcement and atoms,
get rid of them. This shows that S5 plus public announcements is equivalent to S5 itself.
So if we would be able to come up with a reduction principle for announcements and , we would have a complete
logic for a language with knowledge, announcements and the comparison operator . However, there is no reduction axiom
for [ϕ]a  b. Even stronger, we will now show that by adding public announcements to CEL we obtain a system that is
more expressive than CEL itself.
Theorem 8. CEL with public announcements is more expressive than CEL.
Proof. We will employ a results about coalitional bisimulations, Theorem 4 (ﬁrst item). Consider the two models M =
〈W , R, V , I〉 and M ′ = 〈W ′, R ′, V ′, I ′〉 depicted in Fig. 11: the atoms p is true at states u and u′ only, and the accessibility
relations for the agents a and b can be read off from the ﬁgure (note that this is an S5-model: reﬂexive arrows are not
drawn). Formally: W = {u,w1,w2,w3} with Ra = W × W and Rb is the reﬂexive closure in W of {(w1,w2), (w2,w1)},
and V (p) = {u}. Similarly, W ′ = {u′,w ′1,w ′2} with R ′a = W ′ × W ′ , R ′b is the reﬂexive closure on W ′ of {(w ′1,w ′2)} and
V ′(p)= {u′}. Both interpretations I and I ′ link  with the superset-relation. We claim the following:
∀ϕ ∈ LCEL (M,w1) | ϕ iff
(
M ′,w ′1
) | ϕ (9)
This is proven by showing that there exists a (natural) extended bisimulation between M,w and M ′,w ′1, which is
R= {(u,u′)}∪ {(wi,w ′j) | i  3, j  2}
To verify that R respects propositional variables is straightforward: p is true in u and u′ , and false in all other worlds.
For relational atoms, b  a is true in all seven worlds, and a  b is false everywhere. (Moreover, b  a is interpreted
in x as Rb(x) ⊆ Ra(x), which makes the extended bisimulation natural.) The ‘forth’ and ‘back’ conditions of R are also
straightforward to check. (9) now follows with Lemma 6.
Now, consider the models N and N ′ of Fig. 12. The situation (N,w1) is the result of publicly announcing ¬p in (M,w1),
whereas (N ′,w ′1) is the result of announcing ¬p in (M ′,w ′). Yet, we have (N,w1) | a  b but (N ′,w ′1) | ¬(a  b). This
implies
(M,w1) | [¬p](a  b) while
(
M ′,w ′1
) | [¬p](a  b)
In other words, although for the language LCEL the models (M,w1) and (M ′,w ′1) are the same, in the language LCEL+PAL ,
we ﬁnd a formula that distinguishes (M,w1) and (M ′,w ′ ). 1
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change the  properties between ‘similar’ models in such a way that they lose their similarity. In particular, where the
presence of world w3 in model M is irrelevant for what is true in w1 (this is what (9) says), because it ‘survives’ the
announcement ¬p, the presence of w3 in the resulting model makes that w1 has more a-successors than b-successors,
which would not have been so (in N ′) if w3 was left out in the ﬁrst place (like in M ′).
4.3.1. Adding coalitional epistemic operators
The notion of ‘knowing at least as’ for individuals has at least two extensions to that of groups. Let C and D to be two









Then, C ∩ D would mean: ‘the distributed knowledge of D is at least that of C (in w)’, and C ∪ D would mean ‘what
everybody in D knows is at least what everybody in C knows (in w)’. For instance, the sentence ‘Steve knows at least what
his parents know’ would have the following three interpretations: (p1  s) ∧ (p2  s) (‘Steve knows at least what each of
his parents knows’) and {p1, p2}∪ {s} (‘Steve knows at least what both of his parents know’) and {p1, p2}∩ {s} (‘Steve
knows at least what his parents distributively know’).
For notions of group knowledge, many other options present themselves. It is well known that common knowledge of a
coalition D , written CD , semantically corresponds to the transitive closure R∗D of the union of the individual relations [7]
Ri (i ∈ D). So one could add primitives like D∗  F ∗ indicating that the common knowledge of coalition D is a subset of
the common knowledge of group F . And the notion of group knowledge on both sides of  do not have to coincide either:
D∗  F E for instance might read: ‘currently, all what is common knowledge in coalition D , is known by everybody in F ’.
4.3.2. Only knowing
There is a rich literature on ‘only knowing’ also in the multi-agent context see for instance [13], the overview paper [26]
or the recent [2]. Although related to the issues that CEL addresses, there are also differences: in only knowing, one tries
to characterise the minimal amount of knowledge of an agent, given he knows a certain fact ϕ . In CEL, the emphasis is on
comparing one agent’s knowledge to another agent’s.
5. Conclusion
We have presented a ﬂexible way to deal locally with quantiﬁcation over formulas. In particular, we have shown how,
under some mild conditions, in a modal logic that extends K with some canonical axioms, one can add a number of
relational atoms, for each of them an axiom and an inference rule, such that the logic is complete for the class of models
that interpret the atom as a ﬁrst order property of the underlying frame. We argued that this presents many opportunities
to express properties concerning the knowledge or beliefs of agents in a local way, so that they are only true now, or as a
belief or knowledge of some speciﬁc agents.
In more detail we investigated the case of ‘comparative epistemic logic’, for the relational atom  such that a  b
informally stands for ‘b knows at least as much as a’. Although we focussed on epistemic and doxastic logics, our technique
is applicable in dynamic settings as well. On our agenda is to study how our framework behaves in a dynamic epistemic
logic setting.
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